Authenticate commands and messages on mission-critical devices.

Let your system keep acting only on data it can prove is genuine once its deployed cryptography is broken, and keep that data confidential when the mission demands it, built on information-theoretically secure cryptography.

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// The Threat

Every computational data-authentication algorithm has a limited lifetime.

Mission-critical data has to be authenticated, or a system acts on commands and telemetry that never came from a trusted source. Today that job rests on computational security: the standardised computational MACs such as HMAC and AES-GMAC, and digital signatures such as RSA, ECDSA, and the post-quantum standards, are secure only while the problem behind them stays too hard to solve, not a proof. A quantum computer breaks RSA and ECDSA, while AI and new cryptanalysis may break the rest, the MACs and post-quantum standards included. Once that assumption falls, the authentication falls with it.

When a system's data authentication is broken:

  • Commands and telemetry can be forged. A man-in-the-middle can issue commands the system accepts as genuine, and falsify what it reports.
  • The system acts on data it cannot trust. With no proof of origin, it can no longer tell a genuine message from a forged one, and acts on both alike.
  • Recorded traffic can be forged or read later. Data an adversary captured years earlier can be forged, or decrypted, at leisure once the cryptography protecting it is broken.
  • Every record becomes suspect at once. For a remote, long-life system that cannot be recalled to be re-secured, one break puts every command, record, and message the system relies on in question.
// QUAUTS

A proven tag on every message, so the system acts only on data it can prove is genuine.

QuBalt protects mission-critical data through QUAUTS, its Quantum- and Cryptanalysis-Secure Authentication System, built on QuBalt's authentication core.

QUAUTS puts an information-theoretically secure tag on every mission-critical message or record, so the system acts only on data it can prove is genuine. Where that data must also be kept confidential, QUAUTS can encrypt it as well.

QUAUTS is delivered as a building block that integrates into your existing systems, symmetrically at both ends of the data path. At each endpoint, the QUAUTS software stack and its pre-shared keys run on the host, and the authentication core generates and verifies a tag for every message, with one-time keys consumed and replenished from the key store. QUAUTS is validated to TRL 4 under the ESA GSTP programme and is adapted to each customer's specific requirements and hardware environment.

// Capabilities
  • A proven tag on every message. Put an information-theoretically secure authentication tag on every command, telemetry frame, and record, so the system acts only on data it can prove is genuine.
  • Across every data path. Telecommands, telemetry, stored records, and inter-node traffic, all authenticated by one building block.
  • FPGA or software. Run the authentication core in an FPGA core or in host software.
// In operation
  • FPGA core or software library. QUAUTS is available as an FPGA core, or as a pure C library on the host processor where no secure FPGA is available, the same building block at both ends.
  • Standalone or alongside. QUAUTS runs on its own, or beside an existing data channel and takes over the moment that channel can no longer be trusted, or on the mission-critical data alone.
  • Keys sized to outlast the mission. Key material is provisioned to both endpoints before deployment, sized with margin, and tracked throughout. Keys are consumed on use and never reused.
  • Encryption is optional. Where the data must also be kept confidential, add a one-time pad for information-theoretic confidentiality (Shannon perfect secrecy), or AES-128/256 with PKCS#7 padding where one-time-pad key material is not practical. Authenticity stays information-theoretic either way.
// A Managed Key Lifecycle

A managed key lifecycle, not rekeying over a breakable channel. Truly random keys are consumed on use, so the key budget is provisioned before deployment, sized with margin to outlast the mission, monitored in operation, and fails secure if ever spent: the system stops authenticating rather than accept unverified traffic. Unlike systems that stay secure only by rekeying reusable keys over the air, QUAUTS needs no such channel: its keys are one-time, and its authentication guarantee rests on no channel a future computer could break. Any replenishment is by offline transfer or one-time-pad-encrypted delivery, so it never weakens that guarantee.

// Application Areas

Cyber resilience for the whole operational life.

Authenticated data keeps a system acting only on what it can prove is genuine, so it stays trustworthy long after the cryptography it was fielded with is broken, and keeps every routine command and record provably genuine before that. We bring this to the systems that must stay trustworthy for their entire operational lifetime:

In space

Satellites, constellations, CubeSats, probes and rovers, ground stations, and their payloads that operate for years and can never be recalled.

In the field

Ships, missiles, remote sensors, wind turbines, and critical infrastructure deployed far from maintenance.

In secure hardware

Cryptographic devices, communication modules, TPMs, HSMs, and QKD nodes that must stay mission-grade across a long fielded life.

// What You Get

When the deployed cryptography breaks, you keep a trusted command path.

For the deployed system, that means data it can trust and control it keeps under attack:

  • Trusted command and control. Commands stay trustworthy over a channel that does not depend on the cryptography being broken, so operators keep a trusted path to command the device to a safe state, isolate compromised subsystems, and recover it, rather than losing control when its other cryptography fails.
  • Proof of origin on every routine message. Every telecommand, telemetry frame, and record carries a proof of origin, so the system acts only on what genuinely came from you, in routine operation as much as in an incident.
  • End-to-end information-theoretic security. With a one-time pad, both the authenticity and the confidentiality of your data are information-theoretic; with AES, authenticity is information-theoretic and confidentiality holds at AES strength.
  • Protection that endures. Authentication stays secure against quantum computers, AI, and future cryptanalysis, so protected data holds for the system's full operational life and beyond it.
  • No break-and-replace cycle. When computational MACs and signatures are eventually broken, systems relying on them must be re-keyed or replaced; QUAUTS-protected data is not affected.
  • One block, every data path. A single building block authenticates telecommands, telemetry, stored records, and inter-node traffic.
  • Sovereign and defence ready. QUAUTS-equipped products qualify for procurements that require information-theoretic protection, which computational-only products cannot meet.
// The Key Difference

Security proven by information theory, not assumed to be hard.

For mission-critical data, the security basis decides how long a system can trust what it acts on: computationally authenticated commands and records become forgeable the moment the assumption behind them falls.

State-of-the-art systems authenticate data with computational MACs and digital signatures, such as HMAC, AES-GMAC, RSA, ECDSA, and the post-quantum standards, all standardised and all based on computational security: their security rests on a problem staying too hard to solve, an assumption that has never been proven. A quantum computer breaks the asymmetric ones, RSA and ECDSA, while AI and new cryptanalysis may break the rest, the MACs and post-quantum standards included. QUAUTS instead uses information-theoretic authentication: provably secure under its stated assumptions of truly random, single-use keys and a correct implementation, and independent of any attacker's computing power, now or in the future. That proof covers the authentication algorithm; full system security also rests on key management and implementation assurance.

QUAUTS therefore rests on a different security basis, one that stays secure against quantum computers, AI, and future cryptanalysis, suited to protecting mission-critical data throughout its entire operational life.

// Frequently asked questions

Questions a technical evaluator asks.

What exactly is information-theoretically secure, and under what assumptions?
The guarantee belongs to the authentication algorithm: at any computing power, the best attack is a blind guess with negligible, fixed odds. It holds under four assumptions, all required: keys are truly random, used exactly once (reuse breaks it), the implementation is correct and free of side-channel or fault leakage, and keys are kept secret and securely provisioned. The authentication core is our validated implementation of that algorithm plus its key management, so the core is not itself called information-theoretically secure; full system security also rests on that key management and on implementation assurance.
How is this different from post-quantum cryptography?
PQC is still computational security: it rests on problems only assumed too hard to solve, and holds only while that assumption holds. QUAUTS authentication does not rest on a hardness assumption, so it stays secure against quantum computers, AI, and future cryptanalysis.
Does recorded data stay protected if it is attacked later?
QUAUTS authentication does not rest on a hardness assumption that can fall later, so recording a message to forge it later gains nothing: at any computing power, and whenever the attempt is made, the best a forger can do is a blind guess with negligible, fixed odds. Its authenticity holds for the mission's whole life and beyond it. Where a one-time pad is used, confidentiality is information-theoretic too; where AES is used, that content rests on AES strength.
Do I have to encrypt?
No. Authentication is always on; encryption is optional. Add a one-time pad for information-theoretic confidentiality, or AES-128/256 where one-time-pad key material is not practical. AES is not itself information-theoretically secure, and authenticity stays information-theoretic either way.
Can QUAUTS run alongside our existing data channel?
Yes. QUAUTS runs on its own, or beside an existing data channel and takes over the moment that channel can no longer be trusted, or on the mission-critical data alone.
Which data can QUAUTS authenticate?
Telecommands, telemetry, stored records, and inter-node traffic, all authenticated by one building block, so the system acts only on data it can prove is genuine.
How are keys provisioned, and what happens if the budget runs low?
Key material is provisioned to both endpoints before deployment, sized with margin to outlast the mission, and monitored in operation. Keys are consumed on use and never reused. If the budget were ever spent, QUAUTS fails secure, stopping authentication rather than accepting unverified traffic. Any replenishment is by offline transfer or one-time-pad-encrypted delivery, so it never weakens the guarantee.
What primitive and standards does QUAUTS use?
Authentication is an information-theoretic one-time MAC, with keys consumed on use and never reused. Optional encryption is a one-time pad, or AES-128/256 with PKCS#7 padding. Validated to TRL 4 under the ESA GSTP programme.
What is QUAUTS's maturity and flight heritage?
The authentication core is validated to TRL 4 under the ESA GSTP programme and is selected for in-orbit demonstration aboard ESA's CyberCUBE, 2026.
What if there is no secure FPGA on the device?
The authentication core is delivered as a pure C library on the host processor instead of an FPGA core, the same building block at both ends.
What footprint, throughput, and overhead does QUAUTS need?
Byte-exact footprint, RAM, CPU budget, per-message tag overhead, throughput, and key-budget sizing are supplied for your target platform. We do not quote figures we have not measured for your case.
Is the implementation hardened against side-channel and fault attacks?
The core is developed within the ESA GSTP programme. Side-channel and fault-injection resistance and radiation tolerance are being implemented in an ongoing project to advance the technology to TRL 5.
// Get in Touch

Discuss your data-authentication requirements

Whether you are protecting telecommands, telemetry, stored records, or inter-node traffic, our team can fit provable authentication, with optional encryption, to the data paths and compliance rules you already work within. Speak with our team about your requirements.

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